The Makkah Alliance May Be Entering a Federated Activation Phase

For much of the past week, the public debate around the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement has centred on a visible question. Will Pakistani or Turkish forces enter the conflict against the Houthis. That question is understandable, but it may also be increasingly incomplete. The most consequential developments are taking place below the threshold of a declared three-state military intervention.

Pakistan has moved from describing operationalisation as being at an early stage in late August to stating on 17 September that it is committed to implementing the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement while declining to disclose when, where, how or what force might be used because those matters involve operational confidentiality.

In the same briefing, Islamabad separately confirmed that its bilateral Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement with Saudi Arabia is already operational and that some force deployments exist under that relationship.^[1][2]

Those statements do not establish that Pakistani forces have begun operations under the trilateral Makkah agreement. They reveal something that may prove more important over time. The founders do not need to wait for a fully developed trilateral military command before the alliance can acquire operational effect.

The alliance already possesses bilateral inheritance.

The Makkah Agreement did not join three militaries with no prior relationship. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia entered the pact with decades of defence cooperation and a separate mutual-defence framework. Türkiye and Pakistan already possessed mature military and defence-industrial ties. Türkiye and Saudi Arabia had also expanded defence-industry cooperation before the August agreement.

The founding declaration itself explicitly built the new pact upon longstanding strategic ties and defence cooperation among the three states.^[3]

This creates an unusual starting point. A conventional alliance normally has to build common institutions before it can translate political commitments into military activity. The Makkah Alliance can potentially move in the opposite direction. Existing bilateral relationships can carry parts of the military burden while the Strategic Political and Defence Committee, Secretariat and future joint bodies gradually connect those activities at the trilateral level.

Makkah Alliance can describe this as bilateral inheritance. It means the new institution inherits capabilities, relationships, agreements and military familiarity that already existed between its members. The task is therefore less about creating every capability from the beginning and more about determining which existing channels should become part of a common defence framework. The present Saudi crisis may be the first time that distinction matters operationally.

Public language is moving closer to implementation.

The wording used by Pakistani officials has changed materially during the past three weeks. On 27 August, Pakistan's Foreign Ministry described operationalisation of the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement as remaining at an early stage. After the inaugural committee meeting in Istanbul, the emphasis shifted toward institution-building, a Saudi-hosted Secretariat and sequential meetings among the three founders.^[2][10]

By 16 September, Pakistan's military spokesman was describing the agreement as an instrument for collective deterrence and defence while stressing that it had no regional ambitions. Türkiye's foreign minister separately described attacks on Saudi Arabia as unacceptable and linked Turkish solidarity to the new defence agreement. A day later, Pakistan's Foreign Ministry was discussing implementation using operational vocabulary including force, objectives, modes and confidentiality.^[4][1]

There is still no public evidence of a formal trilateral combat operation. There is also no published implementing instrument setting out exactly how the collective-defence obligation is activated. The significance lies in where the discussion has moved. Officials are increasingly addressing the form of implementation rather than only explaining the legal character of the pact.

Scarce capabilities may matter more than visible force.

The Saudi military problem is also becoming more specific. Recent reporting indicates that Riyadh has sought air-defence assistance from several partners including Pakistan, Egypt, France and Britain as pressure on interceptor inventories grows. No country had publicly committed combat support at the time of that reporting.^[5]

Separate reporting on 18 September describes a more complicated capability problem. Saudi Arabia retains considerable combat-air capacity, yet outside specialists cited by The National identified intelligence, satellite support and electronic collection as important requirements for generating stronger targeting information. Western personnel were reportedly discussing air-defence assistance inside Saudi Arabia while governments remained reluctant to enter the Yemen war directly.^[6]

This points toward a form of collective defence that is easy to miss when attention is concentrated on combat deployments. An alliance can change a battlefield without placing another country's fighter aircraft over Yemen. Interceptor replenishment, radar integration, intelligence sharing, electronic surveillance, satellite access, logistics, maintenance, force protection and maritime-domain awareness can increase the defensive capacity of the attacked state while leaving national command intact.

The Makkah Alliance Collective-Defence Escalation Ladder places many of these activities within Level 3 material support. The present evidence increasingly makes that level more relevant than it was when the model was first published. The strategic question is becoming one of capability substitution. When a founder begins exhausting a scarce military capability, can another founder replace, reinforce or extend that capability before the shortage becomes a strategic vulnerability. That is a considerably harder test of an alliance than issuing a statement of solidarity.

A federated model may be forming.

Pakistan is simultaneously supporting Saudi security and using its relationship with Iran in efforts to restrain further Houthi attacks. Financial Times reporting on 18 September said Pakistani military leadership had pressed Iranian officials over the threat to Saudi Arabia while maintaining the possibility that Islamabad could be required to defend the Kingdom if formally requested.^[7]

Türkiye brings a different set of relationships, military capabilities and industrial assets. Saudi Arabia remains the state directly managing the current theatre. Each founder therefore approaches the same crisis from a different position, and uniform action would waste much of that advantage. A more plausible early model is distributed responsibility.

Saudi Arabia retains the primary territorial-defence role. Pakistan can contribute through established military channels, deterrent weight and diplomatic access that Riyadh does not possess in the same form. Türkiye can contribute through political backing, military interoperability and its defence-industrial base. The trilateral institution can connect those contributions without requiring each state to perform the same task.

Makkah Alliance can describe this emerging possibility as federated activation. The term is analytical and does not appear in the published agreement. It describes an alliance in which members retain national command and use different existing channels to deliver different parts of a shared defence requirement. The central measure becomes the combined effect rather than identical participation.

Collective defence may be delivered through distributed national capabilities, connected by a common political framework and activated according to the requirement of the crisis.

The absence of a joint war does not imply institutional inactivity.

Saudi Arabia's confrontation with the Houthis has intensified sharply. The Houthis have expanded their control along Yemen's Red Sea coast, Saudi territory has faced missile and drone attacks, and Saudi authorities say an attempted drone attack toward Makkah was intercepted. The Houthis deny that they targeted the holy city. Fighting inside Yemen has also displaced more than 100,000 people in recent weeks.^[8]

At the same time, direct outside military intervention remains limited. The United States has declined a larger role against the Houthis and European governments appear reluctant to commit significant forces.^[9][6]

This combination creates a revealing environment for the Makkah Alliance. The founders are being tested during a period when traditional external security providers are constrained, politically cautious or occupied elsewhere. The need for regional capacity is rising before the new trilateral institution has completed its own development, and that timing may accelerate institutional decisions that would otherwise have taken years.

The first enduring products of the alliance could therefore emerge from present operational shortages. Air and missile defence coordination, intelligence exchange, common logistics, interceptor procurement, maritime surveillance and joint contingency planning all address requirements already visible in the current crisis. These are also areas that correspond closely with the Common Operational Requirements identified by Makkah Alliance across the three founders.

The next test is whether temporary cooperation becomes repeatable.

There is a large difference between assistance provided during one emergency and an alliance acquiring permanent military utility. The founders have already created the Strategic Political and Defence Committee and agreed to establish a Secretariat in Saudi Arabia. The committee also endorsed continued work on defence-industry cooperation, joint production, technology development and further joint activities.^[10]

Those institutions now have a live operational case from which to work. The practical questions include which intelligence can be shared rapidly, which air-defence assets can be moved, how interceptor shortages are replenished, how national command remains intact during collective support, how a request for assistance is transmitted, how maritime threats at Bab el-Mandeb are connected to attacks on Saudi territory, and how political consultation proceeds when one founder has diplomatic access to an actor another founder is confronting. These were previously institutional questions. The Saudi crisis is turning them into practical ones.

The future value of the Makkah Alliance may therefore be decided well before anyone sees a common military formation carrying an alliance insignia. Its first durable achievement could be three states learning how to make their existing capabilities function as parts of a shared defence effort.

Makkah Alliance assessment.

The available public evidence supports an assessment that the agreement is moving beyond its initial declaratory phase and toward practical implementation discussions. It does not establish that Türkiye or Pakistan have begun combat operations under the trilateral pact. The more consequential development is the interaction between the new trilateral institution and the founders' existing bilateral defence relationships.

If those inherited relationships begin supplying intelligence, air defence, logistics, diplomacy and other specialised functions under common political direction, the Makkah Alliance could develop without first building a centralised military command. That would give the agreement a distinctive operating model, with collective defence delivered through distributed national capabilities, connected by a common political framework and activated according to the requirement of the crisis.

The first serious test of the Makkah Alliance may therefore be producing something more consequential than a decision over whether three states enter the same war. It may be revealing how the alliance intends to function.