What IOS-03 proposes
Research purpose. IOS-03 addresses the capability question that follows consultation and national decision: when can an existing national capability, bilateral defence arrangement or industrial capacity be treated as dependable collective capacity for the Makkah Alliance?
Published records already place military coordination, intelligence cooperation, capability integration, joint activity and defence-industrial cooperation inside the Alliance agenda.
Collective usefulness depends on five conditions being satisfied together: the capability must be available, releasable, connectable, accessible and sustainable.
Common access and common interfaces can create substantial collective depth before the founders require common ownership, identical inventories or centralised command.
Boundary of the proposal. The paper does not publish or infer classified readiness, national release authorities, stockpile levels or undisclosed command arrangements. The qualification conditions, integration profiles, burden matrix, institutional allocation model and readiness evidence states remain Makkah Alliance analytical proposals.
Capability integration is now part of the published Makkah Alliance agenda. The 31 August Strategic Political and Defence Committee statement committed the three founders to strengthening defence capabilities and cohesion through joint activities, robust defence-industry cooperation, joint technology development and production. Pakistan's Foreign Ministry subsequently described training, capacity-building, exchange of best practices, defence technology and research as areas of cooperation. On 25 September, the chiefs of defence forces and chiefs of general staff met in Riyadh and specifically discussed intelligence cooperation, military coordination and capability integration.235
The published record therefore establishes the direction of travel, while the practical method remains largely outside the public domain. No published Makkah Alliance document currently sets out a common capability taxonomy, readiness criteria, interface requirements, release categories, collective sustainment method or validation standard. Their absence from the public record does not establish that internal work is absent; it means those arrangements cannot yet be treated as published institutional facts.
Collective capability should be measured by the effect that the three founders can make available together under defined national authorities.
A national platform, unit, sensor, industrial facility or support service becomes relevant to collective defence when it can be released for an agreed purpose, connected to the receiving national force, brought to the point of need or made accessible remotely, sustained for the required period and repeated under a known procedure. The Makkah Alliance can therefore build usable collective capacity before creating common ownership of major defence assets.
Ten parts from mandate to evidence of readiness
Capability integration has entered the official implementation agenda.
The founding agreement covers all aspects of defence cooperation, the 31 August committee statement adds joint activity, defence-industry cooperation, technology development and production, and the 25 September military meeting names capability integration directly. Taken together, these records give the developing Makkah Alliance a mandate that extends beyond equipment acquisition and reaches the practical ability of the three armed forces to support one another.125
Five areas already visible in the public record
Military coordination
Political commitment requires military channels able to translate a defined security requirement into national options, timing and responsibility.
Intelligence cooperation
Shared warning and technical information can strengthen a founder's defensive position while national source protection and release authorities remain intact.
Capability integration
National capabilities need common procedures, technical interfaces and support arrangements before they can produce a dependable collective effect.
Joint activities
Training, capacity-building, exercises and professional exchange provide the means to test procedures before a crisis places time pressure on them.
Industrial follow-through
Joint technology development and production allow recurring operational requirements to feed back into procurement, repair, replenishment and manufacturing.
Source basis: official records cited in this paper. The cards describe the published fields of cooperation, not an assessment of current national readiness.
A capability becomes collectively useful only when five conditions can be satisfied together.
The public debate around defence cooperation often begins with platform inventories. The operational question is wider. A capability can exist nationally and still be unavailable to a partner because national approval is absent, the technical interface is incompatible, movement is impractical, support cannot be sustained or the arrangement has never been validated under a common procedure. The Makkah Alliance Capability Framework therefore treats collective readiness as a chain of five conditions.
Possession is not the same as collective capacity
Available
The capability exists in a form that can be considered for the defined requirement without assuming that it has already been committed.
Releasable
The contributing state can approve the capability, information, service or industrial support under its own national authority and restrictions.
Connectable
The receiving force can employ the contribution through compatible procedures, communications, data, maintenance or technical interfaces.
Accessible
The capability can reach the relevant location, be accessed remotely or be delivered through an agreed host-state, transport or support arrangement.
Sustainable
The contribution can be maintained for the approved duration through replenishment, repair, personnel, spare parts, finance and continuing national consent.
The weakest unresolved condition determines whether a listed national asset can be treated as dependable collective capacity. This approach also prevents a temporary political offer from being recorded as standing readiness before release, compatibility, access and sustainment have been established.
The weakest unresolved condition determines whether a national capability can be treated as dependable collective capacity within this analytical model.
Different capability families require different forms of integration.
The Makkah Alliance Integration Demand Profile describes the degree of coordination a capability family requires before it can be employed collectively. The graphic does not assess current national strength and it does not rank the founders. It is an analytical view of the institutional demand created by the capability itself.
Six integration demands vary by capability family
Scale meaning: relative integration demand within this analytical model, from limited common coordination near the centre to extensive common coordination near the outer edge.
Collective capacity can expand through shared access before common ownership becomes necessary.
The three founders did not enter the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement without prior defence relationships. The Saudi-Pakistan relationship includes a longstanding strategic defence partnership and a bilateral mutual-defence agreement; Pakistan and Türkiye have existing arrangements covering defence purchases, joint research and development, joint ventures and training; Saudi Arabia and Türkiye have already used acquisition, technology-transfer and localisation arrangements in the defence sector.678 These foundations create an institutional advantage because the Makkah Alliance can connect existing channels rather than recreate every function at trilateral level.
A capability framework can therefore distinguish common ownership from common access. Intelligence support, strategic transport, maintenance, training, replenishment, industrial repair, technical expertise and selected defensive support can all create collective capacity without transferring permanent ownership or command. This preserves national authority while allowing the alliance to obtain useful depth earlier in its development.
Four pathways from existing capacity to collective effect
Shared access
A founder makes an approved capability or service available for a defined requirement while ownership and command remain national.
Capability substitution
One founder reinforces or temporarily replaces a scarce enabling function of another through an approved national contribution.
Interface-first integration
The founders standardise the procedure, data exchange, technical connection or support interface required for different national systems to work together.
Selective common provision
A requirement that repeatedly affects all three founders can move from shared access toward joint procurement, common support or a standing service.
Coordination burden extends beyond acquisition and includes authority, information, technical compatibility, movement and sustainment.
The Makkah Alliance Coordination Burden Matrix identifies where each capability family is likely to require more institutional work before collective use. The colour categories describe the expected coordination burden created by the capability, not the current performance of any founding state. Selecting a cell opens the corresponding institutional question and the record that would make the issue decision-ready.
Where the institutional work is likely to concentrate
| Capability family | National approval | Information access | Technical interface | Movement / access | Sustainment |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Air & missile defence | |||||
| ISR & warning | |||||
| Logistics & mobility | |||||
| Maritime security | |||||
| Cyber defence | |||||
| Defence industry | |||||
| Training & doctrine |
The matrix is a capability-characteristic model, not a scorecard of Saudi, Pakistani or Turkish performance.
Institutional responsibility can be distributed differently across national control, common standards and shared delivery.
Capability integration does not require every function to be governed in the same way. Some activities should remain heavily national because they involve sovereign information or direct force employment. Other activities gain value from common standards or shared delivery. The triangular model below places each capability family according to the institutional balance that would best preserve national authority while still allowing collective use. The positions are Makkah Alliance analytical proposals rather than announced government arrangements.
Different functions require different institutional balances
The percentage bars are analytical balances used to explain institutional design, not published government allocations.
The collective capability portfolio can be organised around common outputs rather than platform lists.
A common capability register is most useful when it records the effect that can be made available, the conditions attached to release and the evidence that the contribution can be sustained. Platform inventories remain nationally important, yet they do not by themselves answer the institutional question faced by the Makkah Alliance. The table below therefore describes collective outputs that can be planned without publishing sensitive readiness or force-disposition data.
Seven capability families organised around common outputs
| Capability family | Common output | Minimum collective record | National authority protected | Industrial follow-through |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Air & missile defence | Warning, defensive reinforcement, technical support and replenishment can be coordinated around a defined protected area or function. | Coverage requirement, approved contribution, technical interface, duration and replenishment condition. | Release of systems, interceptors, personnel, data and rules governing employment. | Interceptor, sensor, maintenance and spare-parts requirements can be aggregated where recurring demand is demonstrated. |
| ISR & strategic warning | Approved information can improve warning and defensive decisions without creating a common intelligence service. | Information requirement, source-protection condition, classification, dissemination rule and review point. | Collection sources, methods, national analysis and final release decision. | Common technical requirements can inform secure communications, data handling and sensor support. |
| Logistics & mobility | Approved personnel, equipment and sustainment can move through defined transport, access and support arrangements. | Route or access requirement, host-state permissions, lift, sustainment period and support responsibility. | National control of transport assets, bases, ports, airspace and personnel. | Recurring requirements can support common spares, repair, transport contracting and support services. |
| Maritime security | Shared awareness, coordination and nationally commanded naval contributions can support navigation and sea-lane security. | Area of concern, information exchange, liaison, access and deconfliction requirements. | Command of vessels, national rules, geographic limits and force employment. | Maintenance, unmanned systems, sensors, communications and munitions can enter common planning where appropriate. |
| Cyber defence | Technical assistance, incident information and recovery support can strengthen resilience while national networks remain nationally controlled. | Affected function, technical assistance requested, data handling rules, access limits and termination condition. | Network access, sensitive data, attribution position and offensive cyber authority. | Secure communications, defensive tools, training and technical services can be developed through common requirements. |
| Defence industry | Recurring military requirements can be translated into joint development, production, localisation, repair and replenishment priorities. | Validated demand, technical requirement, expected quantity or capacity, security restrictions and ownership terms. | Procurement authority, export control, technology release and national industrial policy. | This family is the industrial follow-through mechanism for the wider portfolio. |
| Training & interoperability | Procedures can be tested before crisis use through exercises, professional education, technical training and common reference material. | Objective, participating functions, test standard, observed result and corrective action. | National doctrine, training authority and classified tactics. | Training devices, simulation, technical documentation and common support requirements can be developed jointly. |
The portfolio records effect, minimum institutional record, protected national authority and industrial follow-through rather than sensitive platform readiness.
Operational demand can provide a disciplined basis for defence-industrial cooperation.
The 31 August committee statement already places defence-industry cooperation, joint technology development and production inside the Makkah Alliance agenda.2 Existing Saudi-Türkiye localisation arrangements and Pakistan-Türkiye commitments on joint research, development and joint ventures show that the founders already possess bilateral routes for technology, production and industrial cooperation.67 The institutional opportunity is to connect recurring military requirements to those industrial routes without assuming that every requirement needs a new trilateral company or procurement programme.
A capability shortage becomes strategically informative when it recurs, affects more than one founder or cannot be covered reliably through existing access. At that point, the General Secretariat and the relevant military and industrial bodies can convert the operational requirement into a common technical problem, compare existing national solutions, identify where joint production or localisation would add resilience, and return the resulting capacity to the capability register after validation.
Validated shortages should drive industrial cooperation
Recurring shortage
A repeated shortfall in availability, replenishment, repair, transport, technical support or information access is recorded against a common requirement.
Common technical requirement
The requirement is expressed in terms that can be compared across three national inventories without presuming a single supplier or platform.
Existing capacity first
National production, bilateral programmes, localisation arrangements and available suppliers are examined before a new joint programme is created.
Production and sustainment decision
Joint development, production, licensing, stockholding, repair or long-term service becomes relevant where the recurring requirement justifies the cost and governance burden.
Collective readiness requires evidence that survives beyond a single offer of assistance.
A capability register can become misleading when it records political availability without recording whether the contribution has been technically connected, exercised, sustained or reviewed. The Makkah Alliance can reduce this risk by attaching an evidence state to every collective-capability entry. The state describes the evidence available for collective use and avoids publishing sensitive operational readiness figures.
Five evidence states move a capability from identified to reviewable
Requirement and potential contribution recorded
The capability has a defined collective purpose and a responsible national authority.
Release and interface conditions recorded
National restrictions, technical requirements, access conditions and support responsibilities are known.
Procedure tested through an agreed activity
An exercise, technical test, staff activity or real support event has demonstrated that the arrangement can function.
Duration and replenishment have been established
Maintenance, resupply, personnel and continuing authority are sufficient for the approved period.
The entry carries a date or condition for reassessment
Changes in national inventory, policy, technical compatibility or industrial support return the entry to review.
A compact Makkah Alliance capability record
Defined in operational terms without publishing sensitive force plans.
Recorded with the contributing authority and approved scope.
Authority, classification, geography, duration and national restrictions.
Data, communications, technical compatibility, access, maintenance and support.
Exercise, technical test, previous support event or other verified activity.
Date, event, policy change, technical change or sustainment condition.
The evidence-state method deliberately avoids public readiness percentages. It records what has been demonstrated and when the entry must be reconsidered.
The Makkah Alliance can gain depth from complementarity without forcing identical participation.
The founders bring long-standing bilateral defence relationships into a new trilateral agreement, and the official record now places capability integration and defence-industrial cooperation inside the common agenda. The institutional opportunity is to treat difference as a planning fact. A collective requirement can be divided across warning, technical support, transport, replenishment, training, industry and direct defence while each contribution remains nationally authorised.58
The resulting capability framework is therefore compatible with a distributed form of implementation. Common standards can be established where coordination is essential, shared delivery can be developed where recurring requirements justify it, and national control can remain dominant where sovereignty, source protection or force employment requires it. This gives the Makkah Alliance a route toward collective readiness that does not depend on an early centralised command or a common inventory.
Four rules that preserve complementarity
Interface before platform uniformity
Common procedures and technical connections can produce interoperability across mixed national inventories.
Release conditions before public capability claims
Collective availability becomes credible when national authority, restrictions and duration are recorded.
Substitution before duplication
Existing national capacity can cover temporary shortages while recurring needs are assessed for longer-term provision.
Validated demand before new joint programmes
Joint development and production carry greater value when they answer a recurring military requirement already demonstrated through practice.
Relationship with the wider Makkah Alliance institutional work.
IOS-03 addresses the capability question that follows political consultation and national decision. IOS-01 examines how an issue moves through the developing institution, while IOS-02 examines how consultation produces a collective position and nationally authorised options. The Capability Framework addresses whether an approved contribution can actually be made usable and sustained. Each paper can stand independently because the underlying public record and the institutional questions are stated within the publication itself.
OPERATE → RESPOND → BUILD
How warning, assessment, consultation, national decision, coordinated support and review can be connected.
How priority, attribution, assistance requirements and national positions can be organised into a collective decision.
How approved national contributions can become releasable, connectable, accessible and sustainable collective capacity.
Method, limits and editorial status
Public-source institutional analysis using official Saudi, Pakistani and Turkish records. The paper separates published cooperation fields from analytical capability criteria, integration profiles, burden categories and institutional design proposals.
Methods & Sources →The paper does not infer classified force availability, stockpile data, national release authorities, technical vulnerabilities, undisclosed command arrangements or internal readiness ratings.
Military coordination, intelligence cooperation, capability integration, joint activity, defence-industry cooperation, technology development, production, training and capacity-building are grounded in the cited public record. The qualification chain, radar profile, burden matrix, triangular allocation model, portfolio and readiness evidence states are Makkah Alliance analytical proposals.
Makkah Alliance is an independent, non-governmental research initiative and the institutional author of IOS-03. Faizan Imam retains editorial responsibility as Founder & Publisher. No paper-specific external funding or conflict has been declared in this publication record.
Funding & Independence →Sources and published record.
The factual propositions in this assessment are grounded primarily in official records from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye. The capability qualification conditions, Integration Demand Profile, Coordination Burden Matrix, Control-Standards-Delivery Triangle, collective capability portfolio, readiness evidence states and proposed capability record are Makkah Alliance analytical proposals. They are not presented as published treaty provisions, official readiness ratings or announced internal procedures.
The full signed Makkah Joint Defence Agreement has not been published. Official records establish the collective-defence commitment, enhancement of defence cooperation, joint activities, defence-industry cooperation, joint technology development and production, training and capacity-building, military coordination, intelligence cooperation and capability integration. The publication does not infer classified force availability, national release authorities, readiness levels, stockpile data, technical vulnerabilities or undisclosed command arrangements.
Citation and permanent record
Makkah Alliance. The Makkah Alliance Capability Framework. Institutional Operational Series IOS-03, 29 September 2026. https://makkahalliance.com/articles/makkah-alliance-capability-framework.html.
The Makkah Alliance Institutional Operational Series
The Makkah Alliance Institutional Operational Series is a six-paper institutional programme covering operating method, consultation and response, collective capability, defence-industrial cooperation, strategic warning and future accession. Each paper is designed to stand independently while remaining directly connected to the other five.
A proposed operating doctrine for consultation, sovereign decision-making and collective action.
IOS-02 · RESPONDConsultation and Collective ResponseDecision thresholds, consultation routes, readiness states and collective-response packages.
IOS-03 · BUILDThe Makkah Alliance Capability FrameworkA common method for mapping contributions, interoperability requirements and collective capability gaps.
IOS-04 · PRODUCEDefence-Industrial CooperationJoint requirements, co-development, production and supply resilience across the founding states.
IOS-05 · ANTICIPATEStrategic Warning and Joint AssessmentCommon assessment, warning thresholds and information-sharing while preserving national ownership.
IOS-06 · EXPANDThe Makkah Alliance Accession DoctrineA proposed method for assessing future membership against commitment, capability and institutional readiness.