What IOS-04 proposes
Research purpose. IOS-04 addresses the industrial question that follows a validated military requirement: how can the founding states distribute design, production, qualification, sustainment and reserve capacity in a way that improves collective resilience while preserving national industrial authority and technology controls?
The published mandate already includes defence-industry cooperation, joint technology development, production and capability integration, giving industrial planning an operational rather than purely economic basis.
Industrial depth depends on the complete requirement-to-sustainment chain. Multiple factories do not create resilience when they share the same critical component, software entitlement, export approval or repair bottleneck.
Distributed workshare, qualified second sources, repair depth and pre-qualified reserve capacity can add resilience without requiring common ownership of factories, designs or national procurement systems.
Boundary of the proposal. The paper does not infer undisclosed production rates, stock levels, proprietary design rights, classified supply dependencies or unannounced procurement programmes. Proposed cooperation routes, workshare methods, reserve mechanisms and programme-governance arrangements remain Makkah Alliance analytical proposals.
The Makkah Alliance has already crossed an important threshold in its public mandate. The 31 August Strategic Political and Defence Committee statement commits the founders to robust defence-industry cooperation, joint technology development and production as part of strengthening their military capabilities and the cohesion of their armed forces.1 The chiefs of defence meeting in Riyadh on 25 September subsequently placed capability integration inside the immediate military agenda.2 Defence-industrial cooperation is therefore connected to operational implementation rather than sitting only within the economic relationship among the three states.
The difficult part begins after the political mandate. Joint production can add little resilience when all participating factories still depend on the same imported sub-component, external software permission, propulsion source or export approval. Local assembly can increase national content while leaving the most consequential dependency untouched. A useful Makkah Alliance industrial policy therefore has to begin with the military requirement and trace the requirement through design authority, component supply, production rights, test and certification, sustainment and surge capacity.
The principal industrial opportunity is to create depth across three national production bases rather than duplicate complete supply chains inside each founding state.
Saudi demand and localisation policy, Türkiye's established defence-industrial partnerships with both other founders, and Pakistan's defence-production establishments create a basis for distributed workshare. The Makkah Alliance can gain more from deliberate second sources, shared production rights and cross-founder sustainment than from treating every industrial project as a self-contained national localisation programme.
The industrial mandate is broad, while the public rules for implementing it remain limited.
The Makkah Alliance mandate already extends to defence-industry cooperation, joint technology development and production. The public record does not yet set out a trilateral method for choosing joint requirements, allocating workshare, managing intellectual property, approving exports, creating second sources or financing surge capacity. The absence of published detail creates a practical agenda for the General Secretariat and the founders' defence and industrial authorities rather than evidence that such work is absent.
Joint technology and production
The 31 August committee statement explicitly links defence-industry cooperation, joint technology development and production to stronger military capabilities and cohesion.1
Capability integration
The 25 September chiefs meeting identifies capability integration as an immediate area of military cooperation, giving industrial planning an operational demand base.2
Localisation and supply depth
Saudi policy targets localisation of more than 50 per cent of military spending by 2030 and places procurement, manufacturing and technology development inside the same national industrial agenda.3
| Industrial relationship | Published foundation | What it demonstrates | Relevance to IOS-04 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Saudi Arabia–Türkiye | Saudi and Turkish companies signed a UAV localisation agreement in 2023, while Saudi entities also signed memoranda with Roketsan and Aselsan for local production of drone ammunition and optical sensors. SAMI later signed teaming agreements with Turkish companies for land-systems localisation.56 | Acquisition can move into technology transfer, component production and local industrial participation. | Provides an existing route for converting a bilateral project into a wider Makkah Alliance requirement where all founders have a validated need. |
| Pakistan–Türkiye | The two governments have committed to joint research and development, joint ventures and indigenisation, while MILGEM provides an established example of naval co-production involving Pakistani shipbuilding.79 | Design transfer, co-production and local industrial participation can be carried through an established bilateral relationship. | Offers experience in dividing production activity and sustaining a multi-year defence programme across two national industrial bases. |
| Saudi Arabia–Pakistan | The public record establishes close defence cooperation and a separate 2025 strategic mutual-defence agreement, while the publicly documented industrial leg is less developed than the other two bilateral pairings.12 | A strong strategic relationship does not automatically create a visible defence-production channel. | The comparatively thinner public industrial record creates room for targeted Saudi–Pakistan manufacturing, sustainment or component partnerships when a common Makkah Alliance requirement provides the demand case. |
A Makkah Alliance industrial programme should remain traceable from the military requirement to sustained operational availability.
Industrial cooperation becomes credible when every programme can identify the requirement being met, the authority controlling the design, the inputs that can interrupt production, the location of production and test, the acceptance route and the arrangements that keep the capability serviceable after delivery. The model separates these functions so that work can be distributed without implying common ownership of factories, intellectual property or military equipment.
Industrial cooperation gains value when the three national production bases are treated as complementary sources of capacity.
The founders enter the Makkah Alliance with different industrial policies and different public records of co-production. Saudi Arabia brings a large localisation programme and growing national champions. Türkiye brings an established export-oriented defence sector and existing industrial agreements with both other founders. Pakistan brings a state defence-production network spanning aviation, ammunition, land systems, communications, shipbuilding and research establishments. The aim of a trilateral programme should be to combine relevant capacity around a validated requirement rather than force every programme into the same national workshare formula.38
Demand, localisation and industrial expansion
Saudi policy combines procurement with an explicit localisation objective. GAMI reported military-spending localisation at 24.89 per cent by the end of 2024 against a target above 50 per cent by 2030. World Defense Show 2026 and subsequent industrial-city investments show continuing expansion in local manufacturing, autonomous systems and supply-chain capacity.41011
- Large domestic demand can support programme scale.
- Localisation policy can anchor assembly, component production and lifecycle support.
- Saudi capital and industrial sites can support new ventures where the requirement is durable.
Production establishments and co-production experience
Pakistan's Ministry of Defence Production oversees a network that includes PAC, POF, HIT, NRTC, Karachi Shipyard and research establishments. The MILGEM programme with Türkiye provides a documented example of co-production and shipbuilding collaboration rather than simple finished-equipment acquisition.89
- Existing state production establishments can absorb selected manufacturing and sustainment work.
- Naval co-production offers experience in multi-year industrial cooperation with Türkiye.
- Pakistan–Saudi industrial activity can be expanded selectively where a common requirement supplies the commercial and military case.
Design, integration and bilateral industrial bridges
Türkiye already has defence-industrial relationships with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan that include localisation, joint research, joint ventures and co-production. Those bilateral foundations can reduce the institutional distance between a new Makkah Alliance requirement and a workable industrial arrangement.57
- Existing programme relationships can be extended where technology release allows.
- Turkish companies already participate in Saudi localisation programmes.
- Pakistan–Türkiye commitments provide a precedent for joint R&D and indigenisation.
The industrial arrangement should follow the requirement rather than begin with a preferred model of cooperation.
Urgent needs based on mature equipment require a different industrial response from long-horizon requirements involving new design work or restricted technology. The Makkah Alliance cooperation route therefore varies according to operational urgency, design maturity and technology sensitivity, while national procurement authority, technology controls and operational employment remain with the founding states.
Industrial resilience is determined by the interruption point that can stop output across all participating production locations.
Multiple national assembly or repair lines do not create genuine resilience when they depend on the same approval, component, software entitlement, transport corridor or production bottleneck. The Makkah Alliance Supply Resilience Test isolates the part of the chain exposed by a disruption and the capacity that must exist before the disruption occurs.
Joint production becomes durable when programme rights are settled before production begins.
A trilateral project can fail even when the military requirement is sound and the factories are available. The unresolved issues are often contractual and sovereign: who owns the design baseline, which state can produce which component, whether a founder can export its locally produced version, who funds requalification after a design change, and what happens when one supplier cannot deliver during a crisis. These decisions should form part of the programme record rather than being deferred until production is interrupted.
| Programme decision | Question to settle | Makkah Alliance value | National authority preserved |
|---|---|---|---|
| Joint requirement baseline | Which military effect and minimum technical requirement are common to more than one founder? | Prevents three procurement processes from creating avoidable incompatibility. | Each founder retains authority over its national variant and quantity. |
| Design authority | Who controls the technical baseline and approves changes after production begins? | Creates a clear path for upgrades, certification and defect resolution. | Sensitive source data remains subject to the originating state's release conditions. |
| Production rights | Which items can be manufactured, assembled, repaired or requalified in each founding state? | Makes localisation measurable in terms of actual production rights rather than final assembly alone. | National industrial policy and security rules continue to apply. |
| Second-source qualification | Which critical components require a qualified alternative supplier or founder production line? | Reduces the effect of a single external interruption on all three founders. | Substitution occurs only within approved technical and security limits. |
| Export and re-transfer consent | Can a founder export or transfer its locally produced item, and what approvals are required? | Prevents industrial cooperation from becoming unusable when third-country demand or emergency transfer arises. | Originating technology owners retain agreed consent rights. |
| Sustainment and surge | Who holds spares, tooling, repair rights and production headroom for emergency demand? | Connects industrial planning directly to collective readiness. | Activation of national surge capacity remains a sovereign decision. |
| Cost and demand allocation | How are non-recurring engineering, tooling, minimum orders and inventory carrying costs divided? | Reduces the risk that politically attractive projects become commercially fragile. | Each founder approves its own financial commitment under national procedures. |
Early industrial cooperation should concentrate on recurring military demand and supply points where resilience can be improved without waiting for a major new platform.
The strongest early industrial opportunities are those tied to recurring military demand, replenishment, sustainment and technical support rather than prestige programmes selected before a common requirement exists. Air and missile defence support, maritime security, munitions depth, secure electronics, unmanned systems and cross-founder repair capacity are areas where documented bilateral industrial foundations can be connected to wider Makkah Alliance requirements without presuming an announced procurement decision.
Air and missile defence sustainment
Current Saudi operational pressure makes replenishment, maintenance and defensive-system availability more consequential than headline platform acquisition. Common work could begin with support equipment, approved component alternatives, maintenance rights, training and selected replenishment requirements.
Uncrewed and counter-UAS families
Saudi Arabia already has localisation arrangements with Turkish companies in UAVs, sensors and ammunition, while Saudi industrial investment in autonomous systems has continued during 2026. This makes the area suitable for examining common interfaces, local component sources, counter-UAS integration and lifecycle support.511
Naval sustainment and unmanned maritime support
Saudi Red Sea exposure and Pakistan–Türkiye naval co-production create different but complementary foundations. The first industrial value may lie in repair, sensors, secure communications, unmanned surveillance and sustainment rather than a new common combatant vessel.
Ammunition and precision-effect depth
Joint production can add resilience where recurring consumption is high and where technical specifications can be standardised without exposing highly restricted design data. The industrial priority should be the complete supply chain, including energetic inputs, fuzing, electronics, quality assurance and storage.
Secure electronics and mission support
Common communications, sensor support and technical data exchange can create demand for secure electronics, test equipment and software-support arrangements. These are smaller than major platforms but can determine whether different national systems can operate together.
Distributed maintenance and repair
Repair rights, test benches, certified technicians, spare parts and depot capacity can be distributed across the three founders so that operational availability does not depend on returning equipment to a single foreign supplier or a single national facility.
Industrial resilience requires qualified capacity to exist before emergency demand reaches the production system.
Factories cannot create additional output immediately when tooling, production rights, test equipment, technical data, qualified suppliers, trained personnel or long-lead materials are absent. Makkah Alliance therefore proposes a Makkah Alliance Industrial Reserve: nationally controlled production, repair and replenishment capacity that has been qualified in advance and can be expanded or redirected after sovereign approval. The concept does not require common ownership of industrial assets or permanent idle production lines.
Industrial cooperation becomes fragile when localisation ambition exceeds technology access, demand scale or supply-chain depth.
The principal risks are institutional as much as industrial. A programme can carry a joint-production label while remaining dependent on one external approval, duplicating low-value assembly, fragmenting into incompatible national variants or discovering that emergency production still requires approvals that were never prepared in advance.
Shared external dependency
Several national production lines can still rely on one foreign engine, chip, seeker, software key, specialist material or approval authority.
Duplicated localisation
Each founder can establish domestic assembly of the same item while the difficult component, software, test or repair function remains external.
Technology and export control
Third-party technology, end-use rules, re-transfer restrictions or national security classifications can constrain joint production after workshare has been agreed.
Insufficient common demand
Three national requirements may still be too small, irregular or technically different to justify duplicated tooling, new factories or bespoke co-development.
Configuration divergence
National variants can separate over time until common spares, software, test equipment and training no longer transfer reliably between founders.
Crisis-time legal delay
Commercial contracts may exist while emergency production, cross-border movement or transfer of sensitive components still requires new national approvals.
A practical industrial agenda can begin with requirements, supply depth and sustainment before the founders select a flagship joint platform.
A large co-developed platform may eventually become politically attractive, yet early institutional value is more likely to come from disciplined requirement-setting and the industrial work that increases readiness across existing fleets. The sequence below concentrates first on what the founders need to know about their shared demand and dependencies.
Common requirement register
Identify recurring capability shortages and sustainment needs that affect at least two founders, with separate treatment of operational urgency, technical sensitivity and expected demand.
Sub-tier dependency review
For selected requirements, trace critical imported components, software permissions, long-lead materials, test dependencies and single-source suppliers before deciding where localisation creates real resilience.
Second-source and repair pilots
Qualify a limited number of cross-founder component, repair or replenishment arrangements that can be tested without creating a major new procurement programme.
Joint programme selection
Select co-development or joint-production projects only where demand, technology access, workshare, lifecycle economics and national approvals are sufficiently mature to sustain the programme.
Method, limits and editorial status
Public-source institutional analysis using official Saudi, Pakistani and Turkish records, military-industry authorities and documented bilateral defence-industrial arrangements. The paper separates published cooperation from proposed workshare, production, resilience and reserve mechanisms.
Methods & Sources →The paper does not infer undisclosed production rates, stock levels, proprietary design rights, classified supply dependencies, unannounced procurement programmes or crisis-time authorities that have not been published.
Defence-industry cooperation, joint technology development, production and capability integration are grounded in the cited public record. Cooperation routes, distributed workshare, supply-resilience tests, reserve mechanisms and programme-governance arrangements are Makkah Alliance analytical proposals.
Makkah Alliance is an independent, non-governmental research initiative and the institutional author of IOS-04. Faizan Imam retains editorial responsibility as Founder & Publisher. No paper-specific external funding or conflict has been declared in this publication record.
Funding & Independence →Sources and published record.
The factual propositions in this assessment are grounded principally in official records from the three founding states, Saudi military-industry authorities, Pakistan defence-production institutions and documented bilateral defence-industrial agreements. Proposed workshare, cooperation routes, resilience measures, reserve mechanisms and programme-governance arrangements are Makkah Alliance analytical proposals and are treated separately from published government decisions.
Official records establish the published industrial mandate and documented bilateral cooperation. This assessment does not infer undisclosed production rates, stock levels, proprietary design rights, classified supply dependencies or unannounced procurement programmes. Where an industrial route or reserve provision is proposed, it is presented as an institutional option rather than as an official Makkah Alliance decision. Sources accessed 12 October 2026.
Citation and permanent record
Makkah Alliance. The Makkah Alliance Defence-Industrial Cooperation Framework. Institutional Operational Series IOS-04, 29 September 2026. https://makkahalliance.com/articles/makkah-alliance-defence-industrial-cooperation.html.
The Makkah Alliance Institutional Operational Series
The Makkah Alliance Institutional Operational Series is a six-paper institutional programme covering operating method, consultation and response, collective capability, defence-industrial cooperation, strategic warning and future accession. Each paper is designed to stand independently while remaining directly connected to the other five.
A proposed operating doctrine for consultation, sovereign decision-making and collective action.
IOS-02 · RESPONDConsultation and Collective ResponseDecision thresholds, consultation routes, readiness states and collective-response packages.
IOS-03 · BUILDThe Makkah Alliance Capability FrameworkA common method for mapping contributions, interoperability requirements and collective capability gaps.
IOS-04 · PRODUCEDefence-Industrial CooperationJoint requirements, co-development, production and supply resilience across the founding states.
IOS-05 · ANTICIPATEStrategic Warning and Joint AssessmentCommon assessment, warning thresholds and information-sharing while preserving national ownership.
IOS-06 · EXPANDThe Makkah Alliance Accession DoctrineA proposed method for assessing future membership against commitment, capability and institutional readiness.