What IOS-01 proposes

Research purpose. IOS-01 proposes a repeatable operating method that connects warning, common assessment, consultation, sovereign national decision, coordinated delivery and institutional review without transferring national command to a common body.

01

The public record already identifies the founders, Strategic Political and Defence Committee, General Secretariat and developing committees and working groups. The missing layer is the repeatable method connecting them.

02

The six-stage Operating Cycle separates joint preparation from sovereign release, allowing common assessment and planning while each founder retains authority over national capabilities.

03

Response Packages, readiness matrices, standard records and a sequenced first 100 days would turn institutional continuity into something measurable and repeatable.

Boundary of the proposal. The published record confirms institutions, appointments and fields of cooperation, but not the detailed operating machinery proposed here. Proposed bodies, document names and decision tools remain Makkah Alliance analytical proposals.

The Makkah Joint Defence Agreement has moved rapidly from a founding commitment toward permanent institutional work. The 31 August meeting of the Strategic Political and Defence Committee created the basis for a General Secretariat in Saudi Arabia and committed the founders to further joint activity, defence-industry cooperation, technology development and production. Pakistan appointed Lieutenant General (retired) Nauman Mahmood as the first Secretary-General on 23 September, with the General Secretariat being established in Riyadh. Two days later, the foreign ministers reviewed progress on the General Secretariat, committees and working groups, while the chiefs of defence and chiefs of general staff met in Riyadh to advance intelligence cooperation, military coordination and capability integration.2345

The public record therefore identifies the political authority, the permanent Secretariat and a developing set of committees and working groups. The detailed method connecting those bodies to national decision-making has not been published. The practical requirement is to establish a common way of handling an issue from first warning through assessment, consultation, national authorisation, coordinated support and subsequent institutional learning.

Assessment

The next phase requires a repeatable operating method across the three founding states.

The Makkah Alliance can preserve sovereign command while creating a common institutional sequence. The proposed model assigns joint bodies responsibility for shared assessment, consultation support, coordination and continuity, while military employment and national capability release remain subject to the authority of each founding state.

Eleven parts from institutional basis to implementation

Operating principles.

The operating model begins from the arrangements that are already visible in the public record. The founders retain sovereign authority, the Strategic Political and Defence Committee provides high-level joint direction, and the General Secretariat provides permanent institutional continuity. The 25 September ministerial statement confirms that committees and working groups are being prepared, while the Riyadh military meeting identifies intelligence cooperation, military coordination and capability integration as immediate fields of work.45

Makkah Alliance proposes four operating principles for the developing machinery. These principles are analytical proposals and do not reproduce unpublished treaty provisions or internal government procedures.

Assessment

Four rules that keep the model joint without erasing sovereignty

01Sovereign command

Each founding state retains national authority over its forces, assets, legal approvals and rules governing employment.

02Common assessment

The three founders should work from a shared account of the event, attribution confidence, urgency and possible treaty relevance before major collective decisions are taken.

03Tailored contribution

Contributions should reflect the requirement of the affected founder and the different capabilities, access and responsibilities available to the supporting founders.

04Institutional continuity

The General Secretariat should maintain records, meeting continuity, assigned actions and follow-up so that crisis cooperation becomes repeatable across successive events.

The Makkah Alliance Operating Cycle.

The Makkah Alliance Operating Cycle is a proposed six-stage method for carrying a security issue through one institutional process while preserving national authority. It is intended to give the General Secretariat and the founders a common sequence for routine monitoring, shared assessment, consultation, sovereign approval, coordinated delivery and follow-up. The same sequence can remain deliberate in normal periods and accelerate when an event requires urgent collective consideration.

Assessment

WATCH → ASSESS → CONSULT → AUTHORISE → TASK → REVIEW

Selected stage

WATCH · Routine monitoring and issue capture

National ministries, military authorities, diplomatic channels and designated liaison points monitor developments that may affect the security of a founding state or the wider responsibilities created by the Agreement. The General Secretariat maintains continuity of reporting and ensures that an issue can be elevated without creating a parallel national command chain.

Primary responsibilityNational authorities and designated liaison points
Joint roleGeneral Secretariat continuity and issue registration
Core productInitial Monitoring Note
Movement testWhether the Makkah Alliance Consultation Threshold requires common assessment
WATCHNational lead
ASSESSJoint product
CONSULTJoint process
AUTHORISENational decision
TASKJoint coordination
REVIEWJoint continuity

Source: Makkah Alliance proposed operating method. National authority is deliberately retained at WATCH and AUTHORISE, while the joint machinery supplies common assessment, consultation, coordination and continuity.

Published institution and proposed operating tier.

The published record already provides the upper institutional level. The founding states retain treaty authority. The Strategic Political and Defence Committee brings together foreign ministers, defence ministers and chiefs of defence or general staff. The General Secretariat is being established in Riyadh under the Secretary-General. The 25 September ministerial record also confirms that additional committees and working groups are being prepared.234

The proposed bodies below the published tier are intended as functional options for consideration. Their purpose is to divide recurring work into identifiable responsibilities without creating unnecessary permanent bureaucracy at the start of the institution.

Published authority above, proposed operating machinery below

PublishedConstituent authority and confirmed institutions
Constituent authorityFounding States

Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye retain treaty authority, sovereign command and national decision rights.

Published institutionStrategic Political & Defence Committee

High-level political and defence coordination through the foreign, defence and senior military leadership of the founders.

Published institutionGeneral Secretariat & Secretary-General

Permanent Riyadh-based institution supporting work under the Agreement and maintaining continuity between meetings.

Working responsibilities under development
ProposalMakkah Alliance prospective operating tier
Political continuityCouncil of Permanent Representatives

Senior designated representatives able to maintain routine political continuity and prepare matters for higher-level consideration.

Military directionChiefs of Defence Council

Regularised military direction building on the chiefs meeting already convened in Riyadh on 25 September.

Operational planningJoint Planning & Readiness Staff

Working-level preparation of support options, readiness assessments, common procedures and contingency material.

Strategic warningIntelligence & Strategic Warning Cell

Shared warning, attribution support and preparation of the Makkah Alliance Common Assessment while protecting national source controls.

Industrial deliveryDefence Industry & Technology Board

Joint requirement discussion, production priorities, sustainment, technology cooperation and industrial follow-through.

Capability supportMobility, Logistics & Capability Directorate

Movement, replenishment, sustainment and cross-border support arrangements required for approved assistance.

InteroperabilityTraining, Doctrine & Interoperability Centre

Common procedures, exercises, professional education and technical compatibility across the three armed forces.

Source treatment: the upper tier reflects the published record; the seven bodies below it are Makkah Alliance proposals for functional consideration.

The Makkah Alliance Consultation Threshold.

The Makkah Alliance Consultation Threshold is a proposed decision aid for determining when an event should move from routine national monitoring into a common assessment or formal consultation. Crossing the threshold would create an obligation to consider the issue through the agreed institutional channel. It would not determine the military response in advance.

The threshold should draw on observable conditions. The assessment can be strengthened by a formal request from the affected founder, while serious events may justify consultation before such a request is made if the founders need a shared factual position.

Assessment

Six observable factors feed one consultation decision

01Severity

Deaths, physical damage, territorial penetration, civilian effects and consequences for national defence.

02Persistence

Whether the event is isolated, recurring or part of a sustained campaign affecting a founding state.

03Attribution confidence

Quality of evidence concerning the responsible actor and alleged external support.

Decision aidCONSULT?Consider common assessment or formal consultation
04Strategic function

Effects on critical infrastructure, defence functions, population centres, energy systems, navigation or essential services.

05Geographic scope

National territory, borders, maritime approaches, deployed forces or activity beyond the affected state.

06Founder request

Whether the affected founder has requested consultation, assistance, contingency planning or another defined support form.

Assessment
The consultation decision should rely on conduct, verified effects and official requests.

Public rhetoric can accompany a crisis without changing its institutional status. The Consultation Threshold provides a disciplined basis for deciding when the Alliance should prepare a common assessment, convene an agreed body or begin support planning.

The Sovereign Release Point.

Joint planning becomes difficult when consultation and military employment are treated as the same decision. Makkah Alliance proposes the Sovereign Release Point as the point at which a founding state gives national authority for a specified contribution to become available for an agreed Makkah Alliance task. Planning and coordination can proceed before that point within approved limits. Employment of the contribution remains subject to national authority.

The concept is intended to preserve speed and sovereignty at the same time. The General Secretariat and working bodies can prepare options, identify requirements and resolve administrative questions while national governments retain the final decision over what is released, for what purpose and under which restrictions.

Assessment

The gateway between joint preparation and nationally authorised employment

Before national release

Prepare together

Common assessment, consultation, requirement definition, planning, legal review, readiness checks and coordination can proceed within authorities already granted.

National authoritySovereign Release PointApprove · limit · withhold
After national release

Coordinate approved support

The approved contribution enters the Response Package subject to the releasing state's conditions, national command arrangements and agreed coordination procedures.

The Makkah Alliance Response Package.

A Makkah Alliance Response Package is proposed as the common administrative record for assistance approved in relation to a particular event. It would identify the affected requirement, the contribution authorised by each founder, national restrictions, the body responsible for coordination, sustainment responsibilities and the point at which the package should be reviewed. The package would therefore organise approved assistance without presuming that every founder provides the same form of support.

The categories below show the principal support functions that could be brought into a package. Selecting a category opens the corresponding institutional requirements. The categories are illustrative and remain dependent on national decisions and the circumstances of the event.

Assessment

Eight support functions, one common administrative record

Makkah Alliance Response Package · Function 01

Intelligence & warning

This function establishes the common threat picture required before political or military decisions are considered. It would combine approved national inputs while preserving national source controls and classification restrictions.

Institutional purpose

Provide a shared account of the threat, confidence attached to attribution, likely effects and time sensitivity.

Principal contributors

National intelligence and military authorities, designated liaison points and the proposed Intelligence & Strategic Warning Cell.

Required record

Makkah Alliance Common Assessment with confidence levels, source restrictions and unresolved questions clearly identified.

Coordination test

Whether the founders possess enough shared information to proceed to consultation without overstating attribution or disclosing protected national sources.

Each function remains dependent on national approval, recorded restrictions, a named coordination responsibility and a defined review point.

Decision routing and institutional ownership.

The operating model separates the production of a common institutional record from the sovereign decision of each founder. This distinction allows the Makkah Alliance to become faster without transferring powers that have not been publicly granted to a common command. It also gives the Secretary-General a meaningful continuity role, since decisions, restrictions, assigned actions and review dates can be maintained across the institution.

Decision route across the six-stage Operating Cycle
StagePrimary leadJoint productDecision questionResult
WATCHRoutine monitoringNational authorities with Secretariat liaisonInitial Monitoring NoteDoes the event require common assessment?Routine monitoring continues or the issue enters ASSESS.
ASSESSCommon assessmentDesignated assessment function using national inputsMakkah Alliance Common AssessmentDoes the event meet the Consultation Threshold?Shared factual position and recommendation on consultation.
CONSULTJoint considerationAppropriate political, military or combined channelMakkah Alliance Consultation RecordWhat support options require national decision?Agreed requirements and options sent to founders.
AUTHORISENational decisionEach founding stateNational release decisionWhich contribution is approved and under what restrictions?Sovereign Release Point crossed, limited or withheld.
TASKCoordinated supportRelevant planning and support bodiesMakkah Alliance Response PackageHow are approved contributions coordinated and sustained?Responsibilities, timing, conditions and review points recorded.
REVIEWInstitutional continuityGeneral Secretariat with founder inputMakkah Alliance Continuity ReviewWhat should change before the next comparable event?Assigned actions, capability priorities and procedural amendments.

The Makkah Alliance Capability Readiness Matrix.

The Makkah Alliance requires a standing view of the functions that must be available before support can be coordinated at speed. The Capability Readiness Matrix is proposed as the institutional record linking each common requirement to the questions that must be resolved, the working responsibility that should maintain it and the output required for preparedness.

The public version remains deliberately broad. A governmental version would depend on controlled national inputs, national classifications and authorities appropriate to each field. Its purpose would be to identify unresolved readiness issues early enough for the founders to address them through exercises, planning, industrial cooperation and standing procedures.

Standing requirements to resolve before a crisis
Common requirementStanding institutional questionRelevant working responsibilityRequired output
Strategic warningTimely common understanding of a developing threatWhich information can be shared, at what confidence level and through which protected channel?Intelligence & Strategic Warning CellCommon assessment procedures, warning criteria and source-protection rules.
Air and missile defence resilienceAbility to reinforce defensive capacity under pressureWhich forms of technical, sustainment or approved defensive support can be made available within required time?Joint Planning & Readiness Staff with capability and industrial bodiesReadiness map, support options, sustainment requirements and release authorities.
Mobility and logisticsMovement of approved support across national jurisdictionsWhich clearances, routes, transport assets and sustainment arrangements are required before movement begins?Mobility, Logistics & Capability DirectorateStanding procedures for movement, customs, access, replenishment and host-state support.
Maritime securityCommon awareness across the Red Sea, Gulf and connecting approachesHow should national maritime information and approved coordination be connected during a threat to navigation or a founder's security?Joint Planning & Readiness Staff with national maritime authoritiesCommon maritime picture procedures, liaison arrangements and escalation routes.
Industrial sustainmentAbility to replenish and maintain critical capabilitiesWhich requirements can be supported through joint production, technology cooperation or prioritised industrial capacity?Defence Industry & Technology BoardRequirement priorities, production plans, maintenance pathways and approved technology work.
InteroperabilityAbility of approved contributions to work together without unnecessary delayWhich procedures, communications standards, training activities and professional exchanges require common treatment?Training, Doctrine & Interoperability CentreCommon procedures, exercise objectives, compatibility priorities and lessons for future planning.

A common document set for institutional continuity.

An alliance becomes easier to operate when each stage produces a standard record. The first document set can remain concise and can be expanded as the General Secretariat and working bodies mature. The purpose is to create a reliable chain from the first common assessment to the final review without forcing every crisis into an identical substantive response.

Assessment

Four records create a traceable institutional chain

MA-CAMakkah Alliance Common Assessment

Event description, source confidence, affected founder, urgency, attribution assessment, possible Agreement relevance and recommendation on consultation.

MA-CRMakkah Alliance Consultation Record

Participants, issues considered, founder positions, support requirements, unresolved questions and matters requiring national decision.

MA-RPMakkah Alliance Response Package

Approved contributions, responsible founder, restrictions, coordination body, timing, sustainment responsibility and review point.

MA-CVMakkah Alliance Continuity Review

Outcome, institutional delays, capability shortages, decisions requiring follow-up and assigned action owners with target review dates.

Relationship with the Makkah Alliance Collective-Defence Ladder.

The Makkah Alliance Collective-Defence Ladder classifies the visible intensity of a response across five levels. The Operating Cycle performs a different institutional function by identifying how assessment, consultation, national approval, coordination and review should proceed at each level. Reading the two together allows the response level and the decision process to be assessed separately.

The ladder says how intense; the cycle says how to decide and deliver

Level 1National containmentWATCH · ASSESS

Nationally led response with no automatic collective action.

Level 2Consultation & backingASSESS · CONSULT

Consultation Record and defined support requirements.

Level 3Material supportCONSULT · AUTHORISE · TASK

Approved contributions organised within a Response Package.

Level 4Collective coercive postureCONSULT · AUTHORISE · TASK

A common posture with national authorities and restrictions recorded.

Level 5Direct collective interventionAUTHORISE · TASK · REVIEW

Direct participation under nationally approved conditions.

A proposed first implementation period.

The appointment of the first Secretary-General and the public confirmation that committees and working groups are being prepared create a practical window for early institutional decisions. A limited first work programme can concentrate on procedures that improve continuity and readiness without requiring the founders to settle every long-term question at the outset.34

Forecast

Establish continuity → standardise procedures → test performance

Days 1–30

Establish continuity

  • Confirm national liaison points.
  • Adopt an initial Common Assessment template.
  • Agree secure contact and meeting procedures.
  • Define first Consultation Threshold criteria.
  • Create initial Capability Readiness Matrix categories.
Days 31–60

Establish repeatable working procedures

  • Agree Response Package and release-recording format.
  • Run a non-classified table-top consultation exercise.
  • Identify logistics and interoperability issues.
  • Create a schedule for chiefs and designated representatives.
  • Assign initial industrial requirements for study.
Days 61–100

Test institutional performance

  • Conduct a second exercise covering consultation, release and coordinated support.
  • Complete the first Continuity Review.
  • Agree a recurring strategic-warning review cycle.
  • Publish a limited annual work programme where appropriate.
  • Prepare the next committee meeting around unresolved requirements.

This is a proposed implementation sequence, not a published founder work programme.

Institutional assessment.

The available public record shows that the Makkah Alliance has already passed several early institutional milestones. The founders have established the Strategic Political and Defence Committee, agreed to a Saudi-based General Secretariat, appointed the first Secretary-General, begun work on committees and working groups, and convened the three military chiefs in Riyadh to discuss intelligence cooperation, military coordination and capability integration.2345

The unresolved public question concerns the method that will connect those institutions to national decisions during routine periods and crises. The Makkah Alliance Operating Model proposes that the General Secretariat provide continuity, common records and follow-up; joint bodies prepare shared assessments and support options; and the founding states retain the authority to release national capabilities.

This division gives the new institution a practical role without assuming powers that have not been publicly assigned to it.

The proposed model also connects findings developed in earlier Makkah Alliance analysis. Existing bilateral defence relationships can carry specialised national contributions while the trilateral institution supplies common political direction and continuity. The Collective-Defence Ladder can identify the intensity of the response, while the Operating Cycle provides the recurring process through which requirements are assessed, approved, coordinated and reviewed.

Method, limits and editorial status

Method

Public-source institutional design based principally on official Saudi, Pakistani and Turkish records. Published arrangements are separated from proposed bodies, document names and operating concepts throughout the paper.

Methods & Sources →
Limitations

The paper does not infer unpublished command arrangements, classified intelligence procedures, national rules of engagement or internal Secretariat decisions. A governmental version would require controlled national inputs and appropriate authorities.

Official vs proposed

Founding commitments, the Strategic Political and Defence Committee, the General Secretariat, Secretary-General appointment, committees/work groups under preparation and cited cooperation fields are drawn from public records. The operating tier, cycle, threshold, release point, response package, readiness matrix and document set are Makkah Alliance proposals.

Independence & responsibility

Makkah Alliance is an independent, non-governmental research initiative and the institutional author of IOS-01. Faizan Imam retains editorial responsibility as Founder & Publisher. No paper-specific external funding or conflict has been declared in this publication record.

Funding & Independence →

Sources and published record.

The factual propositions in this assessment are grounded principally in official records from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye. Proposed bodies, document names and operating terms are Makkah Alliance analytical proposals and are labelled accordingly throughout the publication.

Source treatment

Official records establish only what governments have publicly announced. The paper does not infer unpublished command arrangements, classified intelligence procedures, national rules of engagement or internal Secretariat decisions. Where the public record confirms that committees and working groups are under establishment but does not publish their mandates, the proposed operating tier is presented as an option for consideration.

Citation and permanent record

Recommended citation

Makkah Alliance. The Makkah Alliance Operating Model. Institutional Operational Series IOS-01, 29 September 2026. https://makkahalliance.com/articles/makkah-alliance-operating-model.html.

Institutional authorMakkah Alliance
Editorial responsibilityFaizan Imam · Founder & Publisher
PublisherMakkah Alliance
Series identifierIOS-01 · OPERATE
Publication statusPublished · current edition
Version statusVersion 1.0 · Model unchanged
Corrections & revisions

The Makkah Alliance Institutional Operational Series

The Makkah Alliance Institutional Operational Series is a six-paper institutional programme covering operating method, consultation and response, collective capability, defence-industrial cooperation, strategic warning and future accession. Each paper is designed to stand independently while remaining directly connected to the other five.